China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has risen through the ranks to become the largest navy in the world by sheer numbers, but size alone doesn’t equate to strength. Beneath the surface, serious deficiencies in combat experience, technological reliability, and global trustworthiness reveal vulnerabilities that could hinder its ambitions. The PLAN, often portrayed as a formidable force, could be more of a paper tiger when it comes to actual power projection.
The most glaring weakness of the PLAN is its lack of real-world combat experience. Unlike the United States Navy and other QUAD navies that have been in the thick of various conflicts and joint operations, the PLAN has not engaged in significant combat since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Modern naval warfare is a complex beast, requiring operational expertise across high-intensity conflicts, amphibious assaults, and the coordination of carrier strike groups. Unfortunately, PLAN personnel remain largely untested in these critical areas.
Take, for instance, China’s naval drills in the South China Sea, which often resemble more of a choreographed performance than realistic combat simulations. During a joint exercise with Russia in 2021, the PLAN struggled to synchronize operations, exposing gaps in interoperability and command efficiency. Their attempts to emulate carrier-based operations have also been hampered by inexperience, with the Liaoning and Shandong still in the early stages of developing effective strike capabilities. Recent reports of a Type 093 nuclear-powered submarine experiencing catastrophic failure only underscore concerns about operational readiness and safety protocols.
The reliability of China’s weapon technology is another thorn in its side. Indigenous systems often fall short of their advertised capabilities. The much-lauded Type 055 destroyers, for instance, have faced issues during testing, including propulsion failures that forced premature returns to port. Even more troubling is the sinking of a new nuclear submarine during construction, revealing critical gaps in quality control and oversight.
China’s strategy of exporting naval equipment to smaller nations in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is fraught with pitfalls. These exports frequently come with hidden costs—substandard quality and limited operational lifespans. Bangladesh’s purchase of Ming-class submarines, marketed as modern assets, quickly revealed their outdated technology and high maintenance demands. Sri Lanka’s experience with Chinese-built frigates further illustrates this issue, as the P625 frigate suffered from poor manufacturing standards, leading to frequent breakdowns.
Moreover, China’s arms sales foster dependence rather than self-reliance. Unlike Western suppliers that often include technology transfer agreements, Chinese exports come as end-products with minimal post-sale support. This dynamic limits operational flexibility for countries like Pakistan, which finds itself reliant on Chinese technicians for maintenance and upgrades.
The implications of these weaknesses extend beyond China’s shores. As the PLAN’s maritime strategy is increasingly viewed with skepticism, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, nations are beginning to reassess their strategic partnerships. The Quad nations have emphasized the importance of quality over quantity, contrasting their battle-tested fleets with China’s unproven force.
Historically, China’s naval strategy has been shaped by a defensive posture, prioritizing coastal security over blue-water capabilities. This legacy of the “Century of Humiliation” continues to influence its focus on regional dominance, but it also limits its ability to project power globally.
In essence, while the PLAN may boast impressive numbers, its underlying vulnerabilities—from a lack of combat experience to unreliable technology and exploitative defense exports—undermine its credibility as a global naval power. As nations in the IOR and beyond reassess their alliances, it appears that China’s maritime ambitions might be more facade than reality, raising questions about Beijing’s aspirations for regional and global dominance.
