In the wake of the North Sea collision between the Stena Immaculate and the Solong, the maritime industry is grappling with more questions than answers. The arrest of the Solong’s master on suspicion of gross negligence manslaughter has cast a stark spotlight on the technologies and practices that should have prevented this tragedy. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) is delving into navigational practices, fatigue management, vessel conditions, and environmental factors, but the elephant in the room is the role of technology.
The first line of defence against such collisions is the Automatic Identification System (AIS), a short-range coastal tracking system designed to help ships see each other clearly in all conditions. Mandated by the International Marine Organisation (IMO) for commercial ships over 300 gross tonnage and all passenger ships, AIS continuously transmits a vessel’s identity, position, speed, and course. Yet, as British Marine Surveyor William Caselton bluntly stated, “You can just turn [AIS] off.” Vessels can go dark, becoming invisible to other ships and coastal authorities. This loophole raises alarming questions about the reliability of AIS as a collision prevention tool. If either vessel had their AIS switched off, it could explain the catastrophic failure in communication and awareness that led to the collision. The public is left in the dark, awaiting the MAIB’s findings on AIS compliance.
Radar technology, which works in tandem with AIS, sends out high-speed electromagnetic waves to establish the location, distance, velocity, and direction of other vessels. The IMO’s regulations are clear: vessels at risk of collision must take avoiding action. But what if the radar was malfunctioning or switched off? Caselton’s revelation that authorities haven’t confirmed whether either vessel had their radar broadcasting at the time of the collision is a red flag. It suggests a potential breakdown in the very systems designed to keep our seas safe.
Even with advanced technologies, the human element remains crucial. Captains are trained to use their sight and communication tools like Channel 16 VHF to avert disasters. Caselton finds it “quite extraordinary” that authorities haven’t disclosed whether the vessels were in contact. This oversight could indicate a failure in basic communication protocols, a chilling thought given the potential for similar incidents.
The North Sea collision serves as a wake-up call for the maritime industry. It underscores the need for robust, fail-safe technologies and stringent enforcement of regulations. The industry must demand transparency from authorities and push for technological advancements that cannot be easily circumvented. This could mean exploring satellite-based tracking systems that are harder to disable, or advanced collision avoidance systems that integrate multiple sensors and data sources. It could also mean revisiting training protocols to ensure captains are well-versed in both technological and traditional navigational practices.
Moreover, this incident should spark a debate about accountability. If technologies can be switched off, who is responsible when they are? The arrest of the Solong’s master is a start, but it’s just the tip of the iceberg. The industry needs to hold not just individuals, but also companies and regulators accountable for ensuring that safety measures are in place and functioning. This could mean stricter penalties for non-compliance, more rigorous inspections, and a cultural shift towards prioritising safety over cost or convenience.
As the investigation unfolds, the maritime industry stands at a crossroads. It can either double down on outdated practices and technologies, or it can embrace this moment as an opportunity to revolutionise safety standards. The future of maritime safety depends on the choices made today. The industry must demand more from its technologies, its regulations, and its people. Only then can it hope to prevent another North Sea tragedy.
