The North Sea collision between the Stena Immaculate and the Solong has left investigators with more questions than answers, and the maritime industry is abuzz with speculation. The arrest of the Solong’s master on suspicion of gross negligence manslaughter has added a grim layer to the ongoing investigation. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) is diving deep into the navigational practices, fatigue management, vessel conditions, and environmental factors at play during the collision. But the real head-scratcher is the technology—or lack thereof—that might have been in use at the time.
The first line of defence against such disasters is the Automatic Identification System (AIS), a short-range coastal tracking system designed to help ships see each other clearly, even in the foggiest of conditions. The IMO mandates that commercial ships over 300 gross tonnage and all passenger ships must have AIS technology on board. But here’s the kicker: AIS can be switched off, rendering vessels virtually invisible to other ships and authorities. Marine surveyor William Caselton bluntly stated, “You can just turn it off. Vessels that wish to be covert can switch it off and not be seen.” This raises a critical question: were the AIS systems on both vessels operational at the time of the collision? The public is left in the dark until investigators decide to spill the beans.
But AIS isn’t the only technology in the mix. Radar technology, which sends out high-speed electromagnetic waves to establish the location, distance, velocity, and direction of other vessels, works hand-in-hand with AIS. The IMO’s regulations are clear: vessels at risk of collision must take avoiding action. Yet, it’s unclear whether either vessel had the necessary radar technology broadcasting at the time of the collision. Caselton pointed out that even if all else failed, captains still have their own sight to fall back on. Lights on a ship must be turned on, providing at least three nautical miles of visibility. But did either captain use Channel 16 VHF, the international calling and distress radio channel, to communicate? Authorities haven’t said, and Caselton finds this “quite extraordinary.”
This incident has sparked a heated debate about the reliability and enforcement of maritime safety technologies. If AIS can be switched off, what’s the point of having it? And if radar technology isn’t mandatory for all vessels, shouldn’t it be? The maritime industry is at a crossroads, and this collision could be the catalyst for change. The future might see stricter regulations, more robust enforcement, and perhaps even new technologies that can’t be so easily circumvented. The industry needs to ask itself: are we doing enough to prevent such tragedies? This collision should serve as a wake-up call, pushing the industry to re-evaluate its safety protocols and technologies. It’s time to ensure that every vessel is equipped with reliable, tamper-proof systems that can’t be switched off at the flip of a switch. The stakes are high, and the North Sea collision has put the maritime industry under the microscope. It’s time to shine a light on the dark corners of maritime safety and demand better.
