India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s recent congratulatory remarks on the successful testing of the Extended Range Anti-Submarine Rocket, while highlighting the global demand for Indian defence equipment, have sparked a critical conversation about the nation’s underwater defence capabilities. Singh’s assertion that a “big market” awaits India is met with a stark reality: India’s underwater domain awareness (UDA) remains nascent, leaving the country heavily reliant on foreign technology. This gap is not just a technical shortfall but a strategic vulnerability, particularly in the face of China’s expanding submarine and unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) capabilities.
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is a critical arena where India’s UDA deficiencies are most acute. China’s growing underwater presence, coupled with the degrading marine environment and unexplored deep-sea resources, underscores the urgent need for India to develop comprehensive UDA capabilities. Yet, despite the growing importance of UDA technologies, India’s progress remains elementary. The development of UUVs, for instance, is still in the modular phase, with most components imported and assembly and integration challenges persisting. Performance in propulsion, payload, and acoustic systems lags behind advanced technologies, particularly those developed by the United States.
India’s maiden DRDO-developed Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system for submarines, while a significant milestone, pales in comparison to advanced lithium-ion fuel cell-powered AIP systems in terms of power density, environmental-friendliness, and maintenance. Similarly, the development of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) faces operational limitations. The Bharat Electronics Limited-developed ‘Swadheen’ USV, designed for bathometric surveys, mine countermeasure, and reconnaissance operations, has a payload capacity of only 30 kilograms, restricting its operational versatility and confining it to coastal areas.
Policy impediments further exacerbate these capability gaps. The ‘Make-2’ procedure of the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 undermines first-mover advantage by requiring public disclosure of prototypes, discouraging innovation. The Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) scheme, while fostering small-scale innovation, is flawed in design. Startups often cannot provide the 20–30 years of lifecycle support required for procurement, and the scheme overlooks civilian technologies indispensable for initiatives like the Ministry of Earth Sciences’ Deep Ocean Mission.
Structural issues within the niche-technology industry, induced by acquisition procedures and schemes like iDEX, hinder progress. Cumbersome regulatory approvals, certification processes, and high-stakes field trials pose significant challenges for startups. Financial constraints persist, as iDEX funds are disbursed only after startups win an open innovation challenge, leaving them with no reliable capital recourse for prototype development.
To address these gaps, policy shifts are necessary. Introducing policy-based assurance to compensate startups, MSMEs, and R&D institutes for a portion of the No-Cost-No-Commitment (NCNC) trial costs is a critical first step. Amending iDEX regulations to allow private firms to maintain equipment developed by startups, without compromising Quality Assurance, is another imperative. Protecting inventors’ first-mover advantage by avoiding public disclosure on the SRIJAN portal is also crucial. Long-term ‘blue-skies’ R&D should explore undiscovered underwater concepts, materials, propulsion, and detection technologies, with collaboration between the Indian Navy’s Naval Innovation and Indigenisation Organisation (NIIO) and startups.
Upfront R&D subsidies for prototype development are necessary to enhance private sector involvement in making systems like sonars and Anti-Torpedo Defence Systems (ATDS). Indigenisation of navigation control of UUVs for deployment as blue water assets should be prioritised over other components. Leveraging foreign industrial and R&D expertise in underdeveloped systems, such as AIP, advanced sensors, sonars, and ATDS, is critical for bridging capability gaps and ensuring eventual self-reliance.
International collaboration in developing Multi-Aperture Sonars and ATDS, effective in shallow waters, must be considered. For deep-sea awareness, underwater sensor development and sensor network grids, supported with adequate analysis software, require enhanced focus. India’s strategic imperatives in the IOR, coupled with nascent UDA capabilities, necessitate immediate policy reforms. The absence of which would make New Delhi increasingly vulnerable in an evolving maritime threat environment.