The Dutch maritime industry is facing a reckoning after a bombshell investigation revealed that Royal IHC and other Dutch firms unwittingly supplied technology to a secret Russian naval project. The “Russian Secrets” report, a collaboration between The Washington Post, Le Monde, and other international outlets, uncovered that over $8 million worth of Dutch marine tech was delivered to Russia between 2017 and 2019. The twist? These shipments were routed through a Cypriot shell company, Mostrello Commercial Limited, which Royal IHC only blacklisted years later.
This isn’t just a supply chain slip-up—it’s a wake-up call for the maritime tech sector. The investigation found that the acquired products, including civil maritime technology, were repurposed to outfit a specialized vessel designed to protect Russian nuclear submarines. This happened under the radar, with deliveries occurring while Western sanctions against Russia were already in place following the 2014 annexation of Crimea.
Royal IHC has defended its actions, stating that it followed its due diligence process at the time and that Mostrello wasn’t on any sanctions list during the transactions. The company also claims it proactively blacklisted Mostrello in 2021 after receiving a signal from UK authorities. But here’s the rub: the investigation suggests that the screening process might not have been robust enough to catch the shell company’s ties to Russia.
This case highlights a broader issue in the maritime industry—how easily shell companies can be used to bypass sanctions and export controls. It’s a reminder that even the most stringent compliance processes can be outmaneuvered by determined actors. The question now is, how can the industry tighten its screening and due diligence to prevent such lapses in the future?
The revelations also raise concerns about the broader network of shell companies used by Russia to acquire restricted technology. If Dutch firms were unwittingly involved, how many others might have been? This investigation is part of a larger, ongoing probe into Russia’s methods for acquiring Western tech, and the findings could have far-reaching implications for the maritime and defense sectors.
Royal IHC has stated that it has nothing further to add to its formal comment on the matter. But the industry is watching closely. This case could force a rethink of how maritime tech companies approach compliance, risk management, and the vetting of clients and intermediaries. It’s a stark reminder that in the age of sanctions and geopolitical tensions, no company is immune to the risks of unintended involvement in sensitive projects. The maritime sector must now ask itself: are current compliance measures enough, or is it time for a more proactive, transparent approach to safeguarding against such lapses?